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c=preensive stay of this fascinating suhi' t
would examine in rAich greater detail the depth of the political and
social structure of Indonesia.
a readi:1= 1:.
- wledge of
primary

To do this a researcher would need

he Dutch and Indonesian languages as mcst

.,
f-ce material is i

does not have this skill.

these native tongues.

This author

esearch for this wcrk has been

accomplished in the Wasson collection of Cornell University's
11.17,r3ry, the Army War College library and the libraries of
Western Kentucky University and the United States Military Academy
at West Point, New York.
A deliberate obscurity, preserved by Indonesia with
regard to elemental military facts has forced the author in some
instances to draw on normally accessible sources whose reliability
of information is not always certain.
I am deeply indebted to Dr. A. Guy Hope of Western
Kentucky University's Department of Government for his patience
and firm counsel and to Miss Connie Wilson of Western Kentucky
University's Military Science Department for editorial and
clerical assistance.
of this paper.
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Ti 3 7c.I.

of

world lorlay, a

viewer one hundred years hence would certainly notice its many
revolutionary characteristics.
relate: to

Perhaps the most i7nortant of these
ndti:nal:sm

the

rodarniz-t-n,

which ha:, rE,ltcd ir

formation of many n.

_,e

nation, within tne last twenty years, led

by Western-train e.'] intellectuals in many cases.

These new leaders

have been faced with :he 7rohlem that their fellow countrymen do
not necessarily share their beliefs in or understanding of
nationalism.
The leaders, many of them young, have had to become
nation -builders in order to construct political units within the
gcographic boundaries of their new states.

It often appears that

the masses within these new nations have first loyalties to their
tribes, religious units, racial or linguistic groups, or
particular regions.
Confronted with these facts, the leadership of many new
countries has used native military forces to help build a national
consensus.

An army has unique characteristics which may aid or

detract from the formation of a sense of national consentus and
a devotion to, national symbols.
is its mind and it

heart.

Within an army the officer corps

An understanding of this select group

can provide useful ir:7ights into the ideolorjcal icots cf any army.

2

In mis -;tuly the author
IlItary in ,Aldcrdevelc-:,ed countries.

describe the role of the
The essay will then examine

factors which contributed ts the
-

_

1:

•

fec7raical

,thnic, cultural and psychologica
l elements have left
a very definite mark on the TNI (Ten
tara Nasional Indonesia
Indonesian rational Army).
al_s

Lr.7.1

Any effort to understand Indonesia
s of te i-lact of me

Tha ja:anese rccurati-yn 7,rcduced
certain very discecnible traits
which can be found in the army
officer corns during the period
analyzerl.

Indonesia's unique war for ihderendence
formulated

the mecr ideological foundations upon
which the army was built.
An exarination of that critical
period cannot be omitted.
The actual role played by the Indonesi
an military
during the 1950-1958 period is
then examined in comparison and
contrast to precedinc; portions of
this study.
The final chapter contains some conc
lusions which resulted
frcm the study.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ROLE OF THE AFMY IN UNL,ERDEVELCPED
COUNTRIES
The army can affect the political deve
lopment of a nation
in two ways.

It can use force or it can effect chan
ge on the

basis of a minimum resort to fcrc
e and coercion.

OLviouTly,

although the use of force is the
simplest and most expeditious
means available, it is prcbably the
least desirable since
coercive methods often result in anim
osity toward the army and
the central government which orde
red its use, breeding discontent
and disunity.
How can the army affect the politica
l development of a
new nation with a minimal coercive
effort?

First of all, it is

very important that the army be
motivated by some strongly held
political conviction.

In the United States the army is motivate
d

by certain principles of a poli
tical idealism which have been
expressed most effectively by Gene
ral of the Army Douglas MacArthur
and are best exemplified in the
motto of the United States Military
Academy, "Duty, Honor, Country".

Throughout the modern Western

world the most effective forces
in the development of our political
systems have follcwed similar idea
ls.
These forces have been unified.

They must have represented

a viewpoint resulting from a comm
on experience and a common
necessity.

A country's form of government, the trad
ition of its

4

people, the original inhabitants of its land and its geogra
phic
1L.,-tion contribute to this outlook.

It mirrors the philosophy

and way of life from which it has grown.
In significant cases varying from Nigeria to the United
States armies have been protectors of constitutional
orders.

If

a constitutional order does not exist, it may be necess
ary that
the military be an executor of some political progra
m in order
to promote stability which can then result in some
form of
economic growth necessary for the further development
of the
nation.
Inherently, armies have certain economic and social
functions which effect change.

The limit to an army's abilities

to make change lies only in the power that it posses
ses and the
extent to which its officer corps wishes to use this
power.
Armies make direct *and indirect contributions to
the economic
development of a country)

they are training grounds for

technical and administrattve skills and they develo
p managers for
economic enterprises to meet their own requirements
and the needs
of the civilian society.

Py its very nature the army accumulates

a considerable amount of material and techno
logical resources
which are necessary for a country's development.

World War TT

focused attention on expanded military operations
and for the
first time military training on a mass scale
was an important
source of technological assistance to underdevelop
ed countries.
1

Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political
Development of New Nations (Chicago: University
of Ch:cago Press,
1964), pp. 75-76.

5

Eoth the Allies and t].e Axis :o-wei

excns.:i a lar€-„c Tortion of the

world's manpower to technical training and organization
al
disciYe.

Selvice in the armed forces .7.i any country inilies

a di=c

:_reates conesicr

a _en,

ee7r:t de c_1 -

This sErvice affects not only the scidier :Jut a_,:10 his famil
y,
therefore playing an important role in the nation-buildin task.
g
Perhaps the most important contribution that an army can
-,ake t

71-2e

political develc;ment

insisten,:e upon

Et

=mon language

a

•
.rcticr. on:

This is, of course, necessary in t. _ -.1.11tary for instru
ction in
7ilitary subjects and for communication between leader
s and
mbordinates.

It further helps tc erase any tribal and racial

differencc3 which nay exist 1-etween soldiers.

In most ex-British

and ex-French territories the language of the coloni
al
administration has been adopted as the official
language and is
common after the recruit stage.

In Ghana, literacy in English

is the chief aim of early; military training.
of instruction and command.
officially prohibited.2

It is the language

The use of native languages is

Nigeria's current civil war is being

successfully waged by an army which has insist
ed upon this
requirement.

In Peru all officers are specifically prepared by

the National Military College for a continuous literacy
campaign
to brin;-, the remote, inaccessible Trountain areas
under central
control.
2

WIlliam Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in
the New States (New York: Fredce-ick A. Fraeper,
]965), pp. 47-54.

6

t ini_ted upon :his language

Air';

unifor7_

ocn
.clucc r.=

its cfticers.

pic3,cef in _uch a way in the arry,
-n

1

The Indian Army has been

sfhla withaut a cor=n

armed forces serve in an educational role and aid,
for exa-.ole, in improving adult literacy, disease prevention,
personal hygiene and infant welfare.
fcl c

oa

Inherently, a well trained

as:1st in develL,ing
-

uhlic

aftef natural disasters by building
bride:. roads and other enL-ineering ;
- rojects which contribute
to a country's econc7ic rehatilitatirm and growth.
There is little doubt That The military can have a very
effecti-.-.= role in the developme , of a new nation without the use
of force or coercion when organized and oriented properly.

:-.

Tndonesia is
all cf

unitary state in Southeast Asia occupying

Malay Archipelago west of New Guinea and south of the
east

mIle

2n 7-_h

n,:rthwe -

westerr. =:ection of "Ecrneo.

half of Timor, a 90. square
Timor, and the north-

't is remarkable that such a diverse

spot on -_ne face of the globe

an Sc cnited under one flag.

Ori,71nall7 grouped tc, ether by the T.Itch for economic
exploiticn, with no other viable common heritage, it is a
source of wonderment that this rich, resource-laden modern
political unit continues to survive amid the stronger, power-mad,
greedy nations of the world.
The more than 3,000 islands composing Indonesia stretch
1,100 miles across the equator (5°30' north to 12

south latitude)

and 2,800 miles between Asia and Australia (950 to 135° east
longitude) and separate the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Ocean.
The country has an area of 575,893 square miles, in six main
physical divisions:

Sumatra; Java (including Madura);

Kalimantan (Borneo); Sulawesi (Celebes); Nusa Tenggara (the lesser
Sunda

chiefly Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores and

Timor); an] Maluke (Moluccas).

8

a ionnlation of '22,700,C00, acccrling to tho 1360
est mat-

the Indonesian National Planning Council, Indonesia
oc -t:or 'ices countzy _;1•- the ‘:orli.

I:: • ->!,
of -

wereestinated _s follows:

Tne ecn•..1,
itions
Java, bS -illion:

nillion: Sulawesi, 1 million; and Kalimantan, 4 million.

Sumatre,

71cgically, the Indonesian archipelago has three sections:
(1) the Snr:

latform, a southeastern extension of ancient
ncw

Sui7.atr7,,

water

and the

tem

centinent: (2) the Sahul Shelf, the rorthernnost

section .77 *e ancient Australian Shield, also above sea level
in recen: ,.- eclo7,1cal times, supporting the eastern islands and
New Cuinr_ : rand (.?,) an intermediate area, including the western
island of Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi and some of the Maluku, all
rising out of deep waters that were once part of a broad strait
separating the enlarged Asiatic and Australian continents.
Wallace'- line and Weber's line (a theoretical dividing line
serving as a boundary between the Asiatic and Australian
zoogeogra;hic regions) running between Bali and Limbok mark the
transition between Asiatic and Australian flora and fauna.
Indonesia's topography is one of marked contrasts.

The

most extensive mountain system extending from Northern Sumatra
'4

southward near its west coast curves eastward along southern

.1

Java
Barisan

Tenc,-drd.

The section in Sumatra known as the

ontains ri=es to 12,467 feet at :lount Kerintgi south

of Padani,.

Lsr;e

nanr,es sweep northwar3 across Kalimantan,

Sulawesi and !alul\il.

Indonesia has mole than 100 active or

9

recently active volcanoes, most of
system.

part of the major mountain

Lake Toba, Indonesia's la:zest fresh water lake, occupies

a huge extinct acicanic caldera in .o
voicaaa
Strait 'between
1883.

hem

Sumatra.

Tha most

Una; island of a_akaaau, in the Funa
,matra and Java, aa:ch erupted explcsivala in

Broad plains lie east of the 1?.arisan Mountains in Sumatra,

aorth of the volcanic mountains in :ava, and in several parts of
Kalimantan.
Elsaw'aara most level land
of mountainous islands.

Waters

::alacca between Sumatra and

alaya.

fund on coastal fringes
=aallow in the strait of
the Karimata Strait

between Kaliman:an and Sumatra, in -*a- Java Sea on the Sunda
Platform, and on :he Sahul Shelf in eastern Indonesia; but deep
waters are characteristic of the Indian Ocean and the narrow
seas, including ::akassar Strait between Kalimantan and Sulawe
si,
of the central archipelago.

The longest rivers are the eastern

flowing streams cf Sumatra with headwaters near the wester
n coast
and those of Kalimantan rising in its north-central mounta
ins.
Located astride the equator, Indonesia has a tropical
marine climate, having at sea level uniform:, high temperatures
,
high humidity and moderate to heavy rainfall.

Season-ability

results from changes in wind patterns and directions.

The average

monthly temperature ranges between 770 and 810 F; the average
daily temperature fluctuates between 70° and 900 F; and the
absolute range is 61° to 970 F.
Most of westarn and northern Tadonesia is characteriaed
by a tropical rain rore,
;t cimate with average annual rainfall of

10

Tr.c,re tr-n 9, Inchcs.

Eastward fx

ccrtral Java a f,avanl--.

tropical wet and dry climate prevails, with decreed anmual
rainfall and increased variaDility as to total
of dry season.

Throughout

11

length

aunt of rF,infall, .:mperature,

an,: humidity vary with elevation, winds and distance from the coast.
The Asiatic or west monsoon is strongest close to the continent;
the Australian monsoon influences eastern Indonesia.

The decrease

of tem7:-- rat.re at inc- l-ea,,ed elevations is shown in Java, wl.ere
at

_ILta (coastal) the average annual temperat-re is 7

F; at

Bogor (800 feet), 75° F; at Bandund (2,300 feet). 710 F; and at
Tcsari, (5,ECC feet), 61° F.

Highlands near popul:us lowlands

provide temperature relief, with cooling air drainage, and have
accessible places to visit; they are densely populated in parts
of Java and Sumatra.
Physical diversities such as these have provided ideal
environments for the development of divergent cultural groups.
Access or lack of access to neighboring islands directly affected
the social and cultural characteristics of Indonesia's various
tribal groupings.

If the reader simply considers the various

CaribLean Islands more familiar to him, he can readily think of
specific examples of widely varying races, religions and
governments which have sprung up in this archipelago.

7:7

ladonesia's :nique awareness of its own cultural diversity
is ;rofound and universal as a result of the living of its many
in eth:-,10 di-:ersitv over a 7eriod of thoasands of years.
bun.::
,
sed different etic grc:s s72eaking two hundred distinct
languages inhabit this vast island complex.

The age-old

Inicnecdan saying "Other fields, o-rhr locusts, other pools, other
fish" highlights the awareness of its different customs present
in this society.
The Indonesian social framework has two structural
features.

It is very diverse in values, outlooks, and capacities

on the cultural level, and its social forms are various, open and
aCaptal;le.

The normal biOlogical process of speciation has

cc7.hined with the position of Indonesia as a crossroads or
confluence of many ways to form varying cultures such as the
Javanese and the Pasisir, both of which arr2 amalgams of elements
from many sources.

The majority of Indonesian peoples have

responded to a continuous historical onslaught cf influences from
alien cultures with receptivity, flexibility, and selectivity.1

Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities,"
indone-:ia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (Ncw Haven, Connecticut: Hraf
1961). pp. 95-06.
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12

Most of the world's !-eligi:ns are represented here.
represents the beliefs of 95 per cent of the people.
:av

I

Islam

Five per cent

ceiall so±le Independent
-ntsian langua.;es which hal_

many close conale , L
structure.

the nighly

imiiar grarmatical

(See A7pen,lix II.)

This collect.:-. of innumerable mountainous islands ringed
by the aal_ :Lva Sea

a groot of people in coastal

areas who have mach::c -or, an

a zecond group of inland

peoples who ar, characterictical:7, nighlv divergent.
Three broad ty;as of societies exist in these islands.
A strongly Hinduize-1 irland group :.ccupies the wet-rice growing
areas.

A trade-oriented, deeply Islamic group lives on the coasts.

Lastly, the interior mountainous regional people are mainly
pagan tribal groups.

These sociocultural tyres are very

indistinct conceptual divisions into which the many groups of
these island people can 1;c! imperfectly fitted.
One-half of the total population of Indonesia makes up
the wet-rice growing group which occupies Central Java and South
Bali.

The culture of this area is strongly derived from India

of the first Millennium.

The people are very formal in etiquette,

insist upon proper recognition of status, and admire spiritual
and social refinemen -f to a very great degree.

The arts, such as

danre mw;ic, .!ran-a, f-nd literaure, are intensively cultivated.
The people of Bali are more traditicn-ori_mted than the Javanese,
who lack diLztinct scc'al hounaaries, because of Java's strong

backgrs -snd of Islam an: colonial :smereial development.

Java has

an absence of institutionalized internal groupings and is almost
s-Z

urban centers.

i7.1 ,
, ,es in these

iaru
E.as are

becoming almcst unmanagea:ole.
The Islamic coastal peoples, like the Malays of Sumatra
and Borneo and the !a'-cassarese of the South Celebes:, are widely
scatteres.

They do, 1.owever, have a common history, particularly

frcm the 24th to the - ;-th centuries when they were involved in
the inte:national spice trade.
by ethnic hetercgeneitv.

These peol_les a/e characterized

They are commercially oriented although

they ha/e high resTect for Islamic religious learning and law.
The most important unifying element is respect for certain types
cf music, dances and literature.

Zany twentieth century towns

have sprung up around former trading kingdoms in this area.
Pagan tribal groups encompass a wide range of cultures
such as the Toradja of the Celebes, the Kayak of interior Borneo
,
the people of Halmahera, of interior Ceram, the lesser Sundra
islands and the Lampong of Sumatra.
until the 20th century.

These people were isolated

For thousands of years they regularly

engaged :n tribal wars and head-hunting.

They are untouched by

Islam or Hinduism, and only recently have Christian missionaries
been active in these areas.
g.ardeninz of sago,

Shifting cultivation of dry rice or

or rcot crops are the agricultural

practices of these sccietieF.

Kinship ties are more important than

territorial ties in this scmi-noradic existence.

14

uch of Indonesia retains

tr.Rditionl form of society.

The Western form of education, however, is very pervasive and
able to all
The
ways as a result.
Indonesia, the world's fifth nost

opulous nation, with

the expanse of its islands sr,readinz over 3,000 miles, is one
f the
It is presently under=cs:r.:7 a
and cultural change.
2 .
Ibid., pp. 24, 32.

COLONIAL INHE-ITACE

Any effort to understand Indonesia must include an analysis
,.:13-7 the impact of the ::etherlands in this "East Indies" area.
natLcns

t. e

The

.avo' en facing

siroe 1.:ta-e 7an1:7,-12.

7E"

confronted indo:lesiu in 1945 at the

1.th of Its indezendence cne

ic:ea cf

me7 muse upon the words of Moc.Karto ::ctc-,:idadc, a former
Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States, when he once asked
an !-.merican audience to "conjure up a vision of the Green Y.cuntain
Boys of New Hampshire in 1776 contemplating the problems of the
20th century's industrialization."

During the past twenty-three

years Indonesia has been asked to "adjust to the 20th century
almost overnight."
Certainly, any attempt to study the Green Mountain Boys
would consider the British contribution as colonizers and
nation-builders.
In Indonesia, the Dutch played a major role, having arrived
there in 1593 to find a virtual cornucopia of natural resources.1
The Dutch went to the Indies for the sole purpose of buying spices. 2
1

Mockarto Notowidigdo, "An ihdonesian Policy Aired at Maintaininz Freedom and Promoting World Peace," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 318 (July, 1958), 45.
2(leorge asselman, TLe Cradle of Colonillism (New Haven:
Yale Thiverrity Press, 1963), p. 454.

1_5

Ft;

he Is_amIc kirnTdcm was breakl.
sltua7:=

Ihe local

chara:t,rizeci by war, bloodshed, crue
lty, and

Lwe,:ry-fivo year

war

et- €- enth century, most of the 1. 1

1ds of the

archipelago had been militarily
subjugated by the Dutch.4
Dutch were very cnly cclonial
istic and exploitive. 5

The

In 1,
201

a2:cc_.-,e, an "ethical" crse :
her In1s. ;Me -.e-hods

'.;FO'4-

by her sul'ects tc

7fe:'Efe

fcr and

pursue her :olicy, The results
achieved under it, and the
evelo-- ent and results of successo
r policies deserve detailed

The ::in2dcm of 11.e Netherland:,
in 1948 consisted of
Holland, the American West Indies,
and the Asian East Indies.

The

East Indies was a political entity
created by the forceful efforts
of the Dutch, who have been describe
d

as

being a sturdy, imaginative,

intelligent, resourceful, courageo
us, determined, religiously
6
inclined, and comparatively liberal
people.
-Stanley K. Hornbeck, "The Unit
ed States and the
Netherlands East Indies," The Anna
ls of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 255
(1948), 124.
4_

, oC:arto Notowidigdo, "The Conf
rontation of influences
In Indonesia," The Annuals of the
American Academy of Political
and Social Science, 244 (1959)
, 68.
5
Herman J. Friedericy, "Indones
ian Problems," The Annals
of :he American Acad
emy of Political and Social Science, 224
(1(4 50),
134.

Stanley

K. Hornbeck, op. cit.

•.:tch

very axclus

-Jrccess to

choose its civil sc-rvan'.s to re.creLant it In the East Indies.
eehdiJaI, .

i7cv=e.et
- Is.

academic :,

and

•:

All

Pl'a0

---:-.c1. 1:,tes

. qualities of character.

Cr.co chosen,

these individuals receieed a government grant while attending a
r:ve year course of seeJe: at either the University of Leiden or
the

W1-3

service fell:ei a

c -

ty three years cf lee, e=t:-e
economy

.:Shec: 13

c

al

:o :ears follree_d
, anthro:::c1...7y, tropical

d ecreerse've col -nia: ti,--eor7.

believed that

enter the

The :utch have always

learn from cther people's errcrs by

studying, ih detail, the frec,uent similarities between the problems
of adjacent cclonial powers.
Candidates for the administrative services studied law for
two years, then worked for three years on specialized colonial
studies.

After their unikiersity examinations, candidates served

one to two years in the colonies as probatieners before their
civil service appointments were confirmed.
The Dutch probationer was a very highly trained specialist
who was probably more qualified for his work than even his British
counterpart.

Unlike the British, however, the Dutch served only

in the East Thdies, a relatively homogeneous area compared to
British trocical derendennies.
The sy:_le

of the Dutch greatly resembled the British

because the 2ritis'e selected their members by appointment rather

xaointion.

The ordinary school curriculum and the

tec1 ofaining peoiod following appointment also were like
o

Thc17utch ?roLa:lon :sericd,
helped to 77,71e their men more hizhly

7
lalists than the British.

trainef
a

Since the East Indies was the most important colony of
the N t'orians, the Dutch directed almost all of their efforts
tcoart its Oeoelopment.

This area had tremendous difficulties

rooted in t'ne social and economic condition of the local
popoaation.
the

There seems to

little doubt that rrior to 1900

:7enly colonialist and exploitative.

However, the

local o:oolation exoerienced phenomenal growth under the Dutch,
to theex,nt that the population expanded eightfold during the
period

to 1950.

Java, for example, had a population of

four and one-half million in 1815 that rose to twenty million in
1880.

It doubled again by 1930, and twenty years later fifty-one

million :,ecole inhabited this main island, which has become one
of the most densely populated areas in the world.8

A Dutch

official estimated that the food needed to support the steadily
mounting oopulation "was increasing by 4.2 kilograms per second"
when the limits of agricultural production by either
9
intensification or extensification were reached in 1940.

'Lennox A. Mills, "Methods of Appointment and Training in
the rrch co- d Dutch Colonial Civil Service," The American
Political Scitnce Review, XXXIII (1936), 468-470.
neman J. Frie 2
- ericy, co. cit., 2n. 135.
9
Amry Vandenhosoh, "The Flaming East," The Annals of the
Ar..p o
- icanof Political and Social Science, 257 (l948), 86.

19

"rf 2u.ch

nt proa,:ly to their long range Drogram

initiated in 1301, 'ilhemina's "ethical" course, which was designed
to

:-7

flf living

le7'oneelan =

or. ral<e

him litefa7, - nd tc: him the first nrinciples
Indonesian nationalists, on the other hand, argue that the Dutch,
becomin: absorbed in 7aterial progress, displaced their nation's
basic value syste7,

..tr.1,ssed cooperation, to2cran,
r, and

avoidance c.f strife) ',nTLettied villaee tradition,

did not-Ling

to "modernize" the nati7es.
the colonials first arrived on the ,
,cene see!<ing to
buy spices a policy of "free enter,erise" prevailed.

However, it

was a virtual seller's monopoly and, as a result, the native rulers
quadrupled their prices to colonial buyers within a few years.
Most natives regarded it as virtuous to deceive the unbelievers
and they knew all the tricks.

They sold spices of inferior

quality, loaded some with water, traded short weights with others,
and some rulers would even sell the same spices twice and require
payment in advance.

Since the Dutch had no court of their own

they truly had no redress.

However, they were willing to submit

their cases to the local authorities for satisfaction due.

The

Euroneans received no redress and were disillusioned by local
Moslem tradition.
By 1629 the English were competing in the local spice
trade.

Although the Dutch had contracts with the natives, tile

islanders preferred to go to nearby English ports where they were
paid twice the Dutch contract price for srices.

As a result, the

2C

natives fell behied oe eheii agree-eente
in the sum of cne-half
million guilders in 1650.

their ewn

The United East India Company was

contraets we_e hrc;een, it seems to have been

inevitable that this authority led to a rati
onale justifying
territorial conquest. 10
By 1680 the retch had seieed all means
cf handlinr, export
crops for the islan;:s and were fercinz
the people to plant crops
calculated tc bin:

:eirhes: e-.aree price.11

This was the first real and deleteri
ous effect that
colonization had on the Indies.

ee the Dutch increased their

control under the East India Company hy
setting up a strong central
Dutch government, ending internal wars
, epidemics, severe
repression by native princes, and gene
ral insecurity, the native
population began to increase significantl
y.

Almost immediately,

the East India Company attempted to
cope with this increase.
Under its direction extensive forest
clearing, cultivation of
virgin lands, and intensification
of land use was implemented,
but to no avail.

Frantically, Indonesian-built irrigation
systems

were improved; new ones were built;
Letter methods of cultivation
and new selected seeds to improve crop
yields were developed.12
The Dutch became further absorbed
in material progress,
as a result of this attempt to resp
cnd to the population increase,
10(leorge 71aeelmen,
11

cit., pp. 454-455.

Flora Bridges, "The Netherlands Pece
rd in Indonesia,"
Current History, 13 (October, 1947),
217.
12
lierman J. Friedericy, oe. cit.
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and little was done to: help the indi7idual islander to break
out of his tredi-,:ional setting.
13
a : me fo,- the Dutch ejoneers.
eentifie

with

Thee

and the people, and reecenie. ed that

they had a nation-building mission to complete as well as a
4
livelihood to gain)
In 1901, as briefly mentioned earlier, Queen Wilhelmina
.:
4

greatly accelerated a rather enlig'tened Dutch liberal co1onia2
tolicy —:en she publicly advocated the "ethical" policy which
resulted from the publicatim of a hook entitled Nax Havelaar
by an unl-ncwn author who had lived In the colonies.

Recognizing

the conditions needed for Western-style capitalism to flourish
in the iniee, the book clarified the colony's need for modern
sanitation, education, and legal and political systems.

The

government of the Netherlands agreed that these items were needed

#

for future profitable operations to continue in the Indies.15
The Dutch believelb in protecting and preserving native
customs and traditions by the use of indirect rule.

The

Netherlands Indies were part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Queen and the Netherlands States-General were the highest
legal political authority.

In actuality this authority was

exercised only for laws of constitutional importance and on main

--Datas C. Smith, Jr., The Land and Reoele of Indonesia
(Philadel hia: J. B. Lippincott Company,
r. O.
rl
r

14_
Stanley K. Hornbeck, op. cit., p. 126.

I

15
Flora bridges, ob. cit.. p. 218.
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princiles of e,--or..

The basis for all Indies Government

can he found in the 7onstit'itional Act
and the Netherlands Indies
7:veree:ent e

n

exerci:ef. ty tne

: t'nehcne cepverreent was

-.e-er of the o:eicnies.

The head :- the colonial government was the
GovernorGeneral, who was a::ointed by the Crown and
,
a council consisting
cf the

_overnor-3e:.eral as president, a vice-president and
four

other -e-Ler
Hollanders.

by the Ci -m.

-Jrecil 1928 all members were

teat time two natives were added.

The council had

to be consulted on certain specific matte
re, although it was only
an advisory body.
organized.
ordinances.

1: 1918 a People's Council or Volksraad was

Its assent was necessary for all legislative
Twenty-five Hollanders, thirty natives and five

foreign orientals -ade up its memtership.
the Volksraad's members were elected.

Sixty per cent of

The remainder was

appointed by the Governor-General after
consultation with the
council of the Nethe-lancis Indies.

It had to be consulted by

the Covernor-Gencral on all legislatio 16
n.

It could amend all

bills, pass on then, petition the Crown and
the States-General,
and it elected a conmittee of twenty deleg
ates.

This committee

had the power to act on proposed ordinances
when the Volksraad
17
was not in session.'

16John
A.
Political Science

Yrlee, "The Dutch East Indies," The American
26 (1932), 712.

17Amry
Vandenbosch, "Southeast Asia and the Philippines,"
The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social
Science, 226 (arch, 1943), 91.
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At the local 1.z%el some ar,ir, w,-re under dirc,ct Dutch
control; others had naive rllers.
-:cven per -.=nt of the

For example, in Januar', 1932,
under naive rule

'ava.

were under native control.

For

70St part, at the local level

Dutch advisors had a great deal of influence.
Under the direct administration concept a considerable
number of small provinces were u-.der the direction of a governor,
or an officer called a reside-A-

Of

assistant residents.

The

a.7:-Inistratcrs had been trained at schools for civil servants at
Batavia, one cf the six largest cities in Java.

These officials

were Hollanders ,rained at the Universities of Leiden or
Utrecht.

In the outer Islands further subdivision was made under

administrators.

Native officials were known in Java as Buptai.-

Starting in 1918 there had been a devolution of responsibility
to these native officials.18
The Dutch appointed to higher positions a small minority
of Javanese and a somewhat larger group of Eurasians who had
been education in Holland.

The greatest majority of policy-

making positions continued to be held by Turopeans.19
The Dutch in the Indies were always close to the mother
country and, partly as a'result, encouraged the develcprent of
large scale Western economic enternrises.70

Most important, they

18John A. Fairlee, op. cit., p. 713.
Lennox A. Mills, op. cit., p. 466.
20Stanley K. Hornbeck
, op. cit., p. 125.
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had a heneficent policy of prohibitini7 the alienation of land
to non-indigenous persons.21

They allowed long-term rental or

leases, but even ind

could not buy land.

ca-sed so 7-I.:oh hitt,,IL(ss that

This

:olicy was r-ciified in the

1920's so that Eurasians could accuire very limited areas without
endangering the land rights of natives.
The develcpment of plantations as an integral part of
the Dutch land policy was helpful for the economy, but it did
not ail the integration of the fifty-odd ethnic groups in this
ccuntry.

The rutch continued to be absorbed in materal progress.
By 1932 public administration was highly developed and

well organized.

Seven national departments existed; they were

justice, civil service, finance, education and worship,
agriculture, industry and commerce, public works and governmental
industries.
The administration of justice was
European and native systAs.

combination of

The Europeans had a civil, commercial,

and penal code which was approximately the same as that of the
Netherlands.

The penal code applied also to the natives and to

foreign orientals.

In civil cases the Chinese followed ruropean

law; however, other orientals were guided by customary family law
except in the case of property matters, when European law was
followed.

Native courts were used for matrimonial and inheritance

cases where Islamic law was applicable.22 .
Additionally, the
21Amry

Vandenbosch, "Southeast Asia and the Philippines,"

E. cit., 93.
22
John A. Fairlee,

22
:cit.,

p. 714.

Volksraad served as a sounding hoard for discontented people, even
though many densely Icpulated areas were greatly underrepresented
en it.
_erin

e early l00's the Dutch were preoccupied with

the population 7::rchlem.

The pressure continued to mount; after

World War I the population increased fifty per cent.24

In 1930

large numbers cf Javanese peasants were forced to emigrate to
less densely Itcculeted areas in another effort to alleviate the
pressure.
The 2'...tch ,
- cre never able to ameliorate this problem
and because of their preoccupation with it, and with material
progress, education suffered.

The Dutch even failed to develop

an understanding by a majority of the people of Dutch culture
and philosophy.
education.

0nly a very few natives received a Western

By 1870 European schools were available.

were allowed to attend in limited numbers.
schools were active in 1421.

Natives

Vocational education

The first college was opened in

1920.
The Dutch took little interest in education of the
Indonesians because they felt it would violate their general
principle of indirect rule.

By acting as they did they failed

to promote either social unity or economic integration, both of
which could have resulted from a more positive educational
approach.

Elementary education was furnished both in Dutch and

"Fiera Bridges, op. cit., p. 220.
24lierm,L J. Triedericy,

DE.

cit., pp. 135-137.

in the verncular.

It did not extend to all childr
en as they

did not speak Dutch.

Most students needed to speak Dutc
h to

a eeccndary or a 7echni,:
'3chool, therefore, t'r•,-

tt

of the poptflat3on

:as

excluded.

rjCrJty

Lccal villa7,es provided * 1--.eir

own early education.
As an exception, the Dutch
system of education on Java
from a practical vocationa
l standpoint did have considera
ble
success.

It was based on a study of
India and the Phil

ines

as examples of too much
literacy and too little technical
education
combined with over-emphasis
on Western culture to the detrim
ent
or the hest elements of
the indigenous native civiliz,
ation. 25
Nationalists attacked the ent
ire Dutch school system
illogically.
Western".

Native schools that existe
d were branded "too

The Dutch were charged with
depriving natives of

educations if schools were
curtailed.
definitely too high.

The cost per pupil was

Western schools educated 146
,215 students

for the same price it tod
k to educate 1,513,088 students
in
equivalent native schools.
26
In brief summary, very little
was done by the Dutch,
educationally, for the people
of the Indies."

Their policy of

protecting native custom
s by indirect rule slowed down
the
cultural unification of
scores of ethnic groups by provid
ing them

25
Lennox A. Mills, op. cit.,
p. 468.
26
Flord Bridges, op. cit., p.
214.
27Dcituo C. Smith, Jr., Cr.
cit., p. 168.

27

28
seaia.cilools for each cthif.c. group.

As a result, only six

per cen: of the popula*.on could take advantage of advanced or
.

-.y

R=1.1;.inr. and culture were unaffected by

,:21j a Icw came in contact with Western c.J1ture.
Only a handful were made aware of the political and philosophical
practices of the west.
Rapid industrialization was started by the Dutch in 1935.
Old i: ..';ences industries such is spinning and weaving were given
new 1.1:-e and importance.

Textiles were the most important new

industry introduced by the Dutch using Western capital.

The

economic life of this area was affected by the Dutch Indirect
rule concept by introducing some large scale industry for the
first tire.

World War II interrupted this Dutch effort in its

infancy.
Ey 1941 the Indies had become of political, economic,
and strategic importance to the whole world.

When other European

populations withdrew in a mass exodus from other parts of
Southeast Asia as the Japanese invasion became imminent, the
Dutch remained; their wives and children shared with the natives
the hardships inflicted by the Japanese.

The Dutch had the

support of a maority of the population, but unarmed and untrained
civilians could do little against a heavily armed, ruthless invader.
•
0

Before the attack the Japanese made vigorous =.ffortS to
win over the native leaders.

With few exceptions all overtures

23Richard A. Butwell, and Amry
Vandenbosch, The Changing
Face of Southeast Asia (Lexington, Kentucky: University of
Kentucky Press, 1)b7), p. 28.

28

were rejecl.e,

lenalists made it clear

at the

to the Dutch that the bill for this loyalty would he presented
fouo:nt h/avely witn the

pay7-.--,:nt after
Lj inst the Japantse.

government instructed

:he

civilians not to resist the enemy troops, but to take action
against ununiformed marauders and parachutists.

The Dutch

organized 37,000 volunteers in Ail Raid Precaution Services and
another 50,000 in Destruction Squads.

About ic,roc guerrillas

were very active during the resistance, desertions were nonexistent, and even when local police offica'.s were arrested
are± shot, the majority of the nationals refused tc collaborate
with the Japanese.
Progress toward self-government was very slow under the
Dutch a:.d no real unified national feeling existed.

However, the

support that the government received while the threat of war
was hanging over the people, and during the invasion, is the very
best indicator of their opinion of Dutch rule as compared to
29
Japanese rule.
The main reason for this support lies in the solid base
of a wide holding of land which resulted from the Dutch prohibition
of the alienation of land to non-indigenous persons.

30

No other

single measure could have had this effect on the natives.

29Lennox A. Mills, "Some Problems of Post War Reconstruction,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
226 (March, 1943), 135-140.
30
Datus C. :pith, Jr.,

OD.

cit., p. 48.
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ed in ranv areas.

Their personal attitudes

in co:.tacts and relationships with the natives aroused suspicion,
L.en lit,er anti:athy.

•

:ternness and
Their ,

not spawn lit.zetion and devotion cn the part of
their oriental subjects.31

The Dutch underrated the native

capacity to assume the responsibility of self-government
primarily because they did not truly know the people.

The

colonial, were able, well trained administrators thoroughly
in

scal law, language, and economics.

They respected

native institutions to an unusual degree resulting in their
failure co assimilate any large number of natives into the Dutch
culture. 32
This policy cf separation left the people unprepared for
independence and for conducting their own affairs.

They were

not trained through education or by going through gradual steps
to self-government.

The Dutch never saw, until it was too late,

the great change in local Indies thought.33

Unlike Britain in

India or the United States in the Philippines, the Dutch were
never able to feel that the freedom movement in the Indies was
ever rea1.34
9riefly, the Dutch recognized the Javanese population
problem.

All measures to improve the situation did not bring
31Stanley

Y. Hornbeck, op. Lit., p. 126.

32Flora F1- 1. ges,
op. cit., p. 220.
33Datus C. Smith, Jr., cyrr.
, cit., p. 41.
34 nrd.,
•
p.2.

_e., alt :;h. hunreds of thcli-,71s ef
natives had found new
existences in Sumatra, Borneo, and the Celeb
es as part of one of

no manufacturi:i.-

facilities had an unfortunate lack of train
ed political,
engineering, educational, medical, and
administrative personne1.35
The Indies had many grave unsolved socia
l and economic problems,
:stly:,:i,;ineting in Java's over7ct'elation
.

The balance between

population and the means of sum:cr.
: -:ar unstable even though the
Indies reached self-sufficiency in fcods
tuffs in 1938.

Though

the stan f
. ard of living was low, it was still highe
r than other
countries in the area except for the Phili
ppines.
epidemics or famines.
dollars.

There were nc

Total exports were in the billions of

Sixty per cent of these exports were produ
ced by

individual local growers.

Industrialization was underway.

Results were seen in many areas when
World War II came.36
The Dutch conquest never was ccmpleted.

It gave a

scattered group of islands political
integration, established law
and order, and internal peace.

The area was developed economically,

though local laws and customs were
left in place, and the old 1)ases
of economic life and welfare were stren
gthened.

The physical

success of this fantastic effort is mirro
red in the amazing increase
in Java's population.

Western-managed plantations and industries

gave Western knowledge and methods
to all involved in the process.
35Xockarto rotowidigao, "An Indonesian
Policy Aimed at
Ma:ntaining rreedom and Promoting World
Peace," (la. cit., 43.
36

Herman •J. rriedericy, op. cit., p. 138.

rest importa%tly, the Dutch ,ssed
7.
the 18E7-1870
legislation which was the keystone of their strengt
h and colonial
rom
villaze t'ar::- lands.

The transportatlon services 1€-velope:1 by

the Dutch made possible a very profitable
interisland and overseas
trade.

Scientific training was provided in Holland and
in the

Indies for civil servants on the islands.
The Netherlands sent into service large numbers
of their
very best men and women, many of whom establi
shed themselves and
their families permanently in the Inr'ies.37
Many Dutch lives, skills, efforts and funds were
invested
In these enterprises.

The rutch and the East Indies profited.

37
Stanley K. Hornbef7k, op. cit., T. 125.

CHAPTER FIVE

JAPANESE LEGACY

Before the Japanese invaded the East Indies there was very
little opportunity for natives to undertake military careers under
the Dut.

Some soldiers from Christian areas did serve in the

Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL).
officers, however.

There were very few native

A few notable exceptions did exist, including

Indonesian Generals Nasution, Simatupang, and Suryadarma, who
served as junior officers.
The Japanese invasion of January 10, 1942, was important
from an Indonesian Army standpoint because the Japanese immediately
organized the natives into military groups and provided military
training.

This period is significant because the greatest number

of senior officers in the army from 1950-19E38 first received
training under the Japanese, while the Japanese occupied in the
1
Indies.
The combined Dutch and Indonesian defense of the
archipelago failed miserably.2
Ey !arch 7, 1942, a central Japanese Military
administrazicn was set up Leaded by a Cunseikan or Chief Military

-bruce Grant, Irh:onesia, (London:
Press, 1964), D. 69.

Melbourne University

0
'N. A. Aziz, Ja an's Colonialism and Indonesia, (The Hague:
Martinas Nijhcff, 195), p. 147.

32

33

Al:Jinistrator who governed nine separate departnts.

As of

August 5, 1942, a rigidly centralized bureaucratic system similar
le Japan'e own 'lac: been organized on Java with Leadquareers at
Eatavia.

This was the headquarters of the Sixteenth Imperial

Japanese Army.

It consisted of two provinces of seventeen

residences each.

Sumatra was placed under the Japanese military

administration of Malaya controlled by the Seventh Imperial
:apanese Army.

Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, and the lesser Scenda

Islands were sepere.ised by the Japanese Naval Administration of
Macassar.3

All native officials were required to swear allegiance

to the Japanese Army.4
The Japanese organized several militarily oriented groups,
the most important of which was the Peta.

Its members were

selected from local influential persons who had strongly developed
senses of racial consciousness.
Japanese army.

The Peta was not a part of the

Peta officers were trained for three months at

guerrilla camps and then; were returned to their villages to
prepare defenses against expected allied attacks, after having
taken an oath of allegiance to the Sixteenth Imperial Japanese
Army.

Noncommissioned officers were also given three months of

training.

The training emphasized infantry tactics in guerrilla

warfare against motorized troops.

Racial sentiments and devotion

to cause were constantly stimulated.
the Nipponese "elan" concept.

Emphasis was placrd on

To "fight or die" and "tr 7:resent

3
F. C. Jones, The Far East, 1942-]946 (London:
University Press, l951, pp. 74-75.
4

.
Azaz, op. cit.,

150.

The Oxford

yourself with your soul, flesh and bloc] for the Javanese Lcmeland
5
and the great East Asia idea" was of great importance.
c,Ificers, were

:n the Peta, oorTany
field ,:r.ao'e officers an

6
above were all Japanese.

There were a number of other Japanese-sponsored
organizations.

The Hei Ho (second class reserve soldier), a work

corps, was part of the Japanese forces.

The Hei Ho were

auxiliary troops in the navy and were considered equal with
Japanese forces.

They were paid and served in the anti-air corps,

and with tanks, artillery and mortars.
The Keiboodan was a civilian organization whose main -'_uty
was to render first aid ih case of fire or air raids.
were an auxiliary police force.

Its merers

The Nami Kikan was a sea-

reconnoitering force used to observe enemy activity along the
coast.

The Beppan or Nansectai furnished information to the

military on anything of importance such as rumors, rebellions,
and all signs of unrest.

This was an observation apparatus to

prevent mistakes by the military government in governing the
popul•ace.
Differing strengths are available on some groups.
hest figures fcund follow:

The

Peta, 37,000; Hei Ho, 25,000;

Keiboodan, 50,000; youth groups, 500,000 to 600,000; student

5Ibid.
•

pp. 227-229.
r.

6
Spencer Paul Miller, Indonesian Military Policy nr;
Envisioned by Two Chiefs of Staff (?,erkeley, California: Univer=ity
of California, 16 May 1958), p. 12.
7Aziz, on. cit.. p. 229.
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service cos,

corps, 50,000; shock troops, P0,000.

-

All of these grc,.:ps were oi- !.i;inally organized under Sixteenth
8

pf-ri 1

-:-if

1uion officers

9
:aTanese under their program.

nad been tr.17,1';.

:en
When the

Japanese realized that they were losing the war they stepped up
their organiza:icnal activities, particularly with the Feta and
the Hei ho,

i7:e as

takeolder.

resistance as possible to any allied
.=.1ry had orgarized aT::roximately

the same number on :..--a.tra and In :!alaya.
liaison

There was very little

-,:hese 7.: ar-,Ies ad their indigenous trcols.

a consequence :be

As

trainees developed entirely differently

with varyinF

ani :cya:ties.

During the revolution and

until 1958 these gro_ps were constantly in opposition.
independence Indonesian army units raised in Sumatra

Upon

were

officered by Sevent.:. Army Peta veterans and those raised in Java
were officered by Sixteenth Army Feta veterans.10

Two separate

armies thus were created and two separate revolutions were fought
.
Throughout the 1950-1958 period these groups were rivals.
Employ7.ent by

he Japanese gave the Indonesians self-

confidence and some :raining for the anticipated time when
the
Indonesians woulo be in full control.11

The Japanese trained

8
Ibid., p. 231.
9
op. cit., p. 45.
10

.

7p. 7.6-2n.

liF. C. jC7

op. cit., p. 374.

seventy Indonesians as battalion commanders, 200 as company commanders,
620 as platoon com7:anders, and 2,300 as section commanders.12
the .7a7ne=e '=;le
Thes-_

However,

no2!.tcallv sophisticated offic,?rs.

:ers

srate ic thining.

They felie,1

en the Japanese '..1;:hting spirit, se-mai:et, which was taught to be
more Important than technical training.13
On August 14, 1945, the Feta and the Hei Ho were officially
-otc:er.

e Japanese in 7ndorr,sia, knowing

they h3d lost the war, revolted against the Allies' decisions w;th
respect to Indonesia.
of
,the country.
5.*

The natives were allowed to assume control

According to the orricial Indonesian Army history,

the people automatically established independent military units
throughout the islanas.

The Indonesian Army was born.

At this early date a quarrel began which remained
unresolved throughout the 1950-1958 period.

The questions concerned

whether Japanese-trained or Dutch-trained officers should control
the military, and whether guerrilla tactics should prevail over more
1
conventional military doctrine.

The Japanese concept of spirited

%,arfare emerge4 the victor.15

"Guy J. Pauker, The Role of the Military in Indonesia
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 19f0), p. 70.
p. 21.
14
Department of the Army, Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian
Army Headquarters Military History, The History of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Special
Issu59), p. R.
15Spencer Paul Miller, on. cit., p. I.

ICF :I2E71=ENCE

The war for independence against the Dutch during the
period 1945 to 1949 created the Indonesian Army's tactical and
stratee,ic outlook.

Ter.eLal Abdui Hans Nasution, the Indonesian

Eefcnse Xinister W.lose theories on guerrilla warfare and defense
formed the basis of Indonesian military policy from 1945 to 1958,
has given eloquent articulation to this outlook.

':uch of his

theorizing is based upon his personal experience in the war for
independence a7ainst the iAltch from 1945 to 1949.

According to

Nasution, this conflict was inevitable because of three factors:i
1.

The Japanese promised self-government to the

Indonesian people in order to secure their cooperation.
2.

The Japanese formed and trained a home guard, the

Peta, which became the nucleus of the TNI when independence came.
3.

The Japanese appointed Indonesians to positions of

high civil service responsibility, giving these officials an
opportunity to acquire administrative experience.
Nasution believes that these factors provided Indonesians
with the will toward independence, the military means to achieve it,
and the administrative ability to sustain independence.2

'Abdul Hans Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 1.
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t

aIrived in Java in September, 1945, they
rou

rutch contingents with them.

Immediately, these European

It.ance

ro7.

cf
Nasution was educated at the Royal Military Academy in
Pandung and was commissioned in the Netherlands Indies Army in
1943.

:urinc- the war he worked in the civil administration and

Li '

.ores in EandLn:.

DivisiJ,n,a

ri1:ci10!1,11

irregular troops, from 1946 to 1948.

he
Army EilSiot. fc)ired frc.)!In 1948 he conducted a

formal study of the first colonial Dutch attack.
Nasution's study of the first Dutch attack led to his
special conceot of the Indonesian defense system and military
organization.

3

Nasution points out that the Indonesian guerrillas

did not defeat the Dutch, but rather they brought the war to a
deadlock using non-cooperation and a scorched-earth policy.
'
International political pressure brought the war to an end.
General Nasution does not merely reproduce :-:so-Tse-Tung's
theory; his thesis is the result of much independent thought.

He

is one of the few guerrilla leaders ,:ho also has had practical
exnerience in counterinsurgency operations.5
He points out the complexity of the ideological guerrilla
war.

iLis form of warfare of the twentieth century has become a

.105.

4

Ibid., c. 20.

5 .
Ihld.,

h-7.
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tctal recle's

Difficultis encountered combating this form

cf conflict der7.aLd more than simple military solutions.

:sych

ical servic.

To win,

Th..? inslonesian Ar17,7, Nasation arues,

is a product of an intense ideological fight and was engaged in
an anti-guerrilla war during 1950-1958.

As a result, the TNI

has served as an ideological pioneer.
1-ilecae cf this ideoloEical effort, he sti-chsly emphasizes
that his !:,csl
- rn
fl7hting for a

is tile vanguard of an ideology,
aim.

It is not merely a political "tool"

to be used with no voice in political decisions.

An army which

iF merely a country's tool to be given instructions, he states,
ces not have the inner strength to withstand a violent guerrilla
war such as that which was the chief threat to the security of
7
his nation during 1950-1958.
Reminding us of the character of Indon2sia's war for
independence, Nasution sees the TNI as having a ver: special
function and position resulting from the army's special guerrilla
background within the country in relation to the people of
Indonesia.

It continues to be not only militarily oriented, but

also politically, psychologically, and socio-economically oriented
as a result of this new total people's war.
Insisting that war now encompasses all of a people's
activities, Nastion looks at this undeveloped, resource-laden

6Ibid., p. 11.
7
Ibid., p. 25.

140

trchipelago, with an area equivalent to Europe's, unable to field
a military force comparable to the USA or the USSR, but which is
faced wit
.•

Ircblems and threats, an.

nust

h

:hclues th:ct his
c,

4-- rely on its guerrilla cc:,..;ei:.ts as the

c3rner!7-cone of its modern defense plan.

Nasution feels that a

badly needed modern air force and navy will not be available for
thirty years because of his country's backward ind,ostrial status.
Thercfc.: , he concludes -:hat if I:.donesia is , ver invaCed it
must re2.y on gue:-rille resistunce t-o force thc invader into a
deadloc;< until international political pressure can again win
Nasuticm's war for him.
According to its first Defense Minister, Indonesia's
revolution is not over, and therefore, its army, acting as the
vanguard of a political ideology, will continue to be politically
8
oriented.
Nasution has a sound theory which could work if a
political ideology has been formulated in Indonesia which could
guide its enlightened army.

Persons familiar with this country's

political background tend to feel that many officers are still
motivated by interest in personal gain and that these officers
conduct themselves as their ancestor war lords did.

The army

generally tends to support the national Pantja Sila ideology,
which encompasses all views, no matter how divercent.9
3 .
Ibid.

06.

9
Interview with Ambassador Howard P. Jones, U. S.
Ambassador to Indonesia, l058-1965, July 17, 1968.

.T.CLE OF ME iNOESI

AY OFFICER CORPS

1950-1958

Did the Indonesian Army 71av an effe
ctive role in the
dev:

..?nt uf it

oun

fr:m 11:.50 to 1958?

it is true :
-Jett

the military nas ten a col
1
itical factor in Indonesia sinc
e 1949.
It was politically important
due to its failure to produce str
ong
political leadership.2
Against this background, it is
relevant to consider the
origins of the Republic of Indo
nesia's army officer corps.
Although Indonesia has an air
force and a navy, the army was by
far the most powerful of the ser
vices. "Unity in diversity"3 is
the Indonesian motto. "Diver
se" is a good adjective to use in
describing the origins of the
army officer corps. A small
number
of officers were educated
by the Dutch prior to 1942. The
greatest
proportion of officers were
drilled by the Japanese from
1943 to
1945, and a third group W3S
militarily oriented during the
struggle
4
for independence from 1945
to 1949.
The United States had
1

Herbert Feith, The Decline
of Constitutional Democracy in
Indonesia (Ithaca, New Yor
k: Cornell University Press, 196
2), p. 200.
2
?race Grant, 22
: cit., o. 1)9.
3_.
michard Eutwell, op. cit.,
p. 25.
4
Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of
the Nilitary in Indcnesia," The
Role of the Military in
Underdeveloped Countries, ed John
J. Tchn:zon
(Fr'Lhceton, Aew Jersey: Prin
ce -Lon University Press, 1962),
p. 187.
141

42

treine.i - 00 as of 13.

Basically, the Dutch trained administrators

"--- men were the army administrators during the period 1950_

an officer tx...c:ed
- 114nI tà

s

This thought

7.ar.fed itself from 1950-1956 in the form of the army's antipolitical ideology.

5

T
he revolutionaries in the army helped

: village dwellers that the
co7.tril-ei-,e to The feeling among man:
r

L1 -7 0.

ThIs

-.alicnellE:m and to erocie tribal ans

t'romote

acial feeiine.

:-]ecause of these very different oric,ins the officer
colps ee:. deeply divided.

Personal 'ealcusies, conflictin7,

outlooks, and special interests contributed to this division.
Addl'ic-ally, this heterogeneous background developed an independence
of SDirit which makes for first-rate guerrilla groups, but failed
to contribute any singular ideological indoctrination needed to
7
discipline and unify their actions.
trained :heir Indonesian officers
battalion commanders.

Li

The Japanese, in particular,
command as independent

Thus the army officer corps lacked in 1950

the training and habit of acting in accordance with broad strategic
8
plans worked out by a general staff.
Even during the Revolution the army officer corps was not
united.9

It immediately became involved in politics and because

5reith, Ea. cit.,
6

. 262.

ItAd., p. 2C8.

7
Pauer, op. cit., pp. 186-136.
p. 209.
9. .
.:111 ,,r,

2E. cit., i • .3.

L3

of this its infl,..ence was 7egative and dispersed rathet than
positive and direct.i°

Officers became satisfied with small

:afds, and tactical ohlectives.

faflee

7o "cic e ranks" riee use their collective strength to create a
s-:rong efficient government.

Moral deterioration and material

corruption set in to a certain degree.11

Military men preferred

to negotiate as individuals rather than to coocerate toward a
e 7.1 -.ta'.(e was realized by Nasutin d):rinz
the lat.ter uart

me rev)luticn it was too ]ate to unify.

weapons ,:ent on t":.e

iac

ioined :artisan ani-:.

!any

:arket, and a number of trained trcor.s

:'Jch 3f the country's potential officer

personnel had been diverted into politics, parliament, and civil
administration.
As Indonesian military policy developed, several beliefs
held by many influential citizens placed certain limits on it.
Generally, it was believed that Indonesia cwed its independence
to itself and to no one 4lse, and that all colonies in the world
should be freed.

A strong belief existed in the legend of the

Just Prince Who would transform Indonesia into a prosperous and
42
happy world power.

These beliefs contributed to a strong sense

of national importance.
A priority of tasks within this fledgling military
establishment was set up.

First, internal pacification and

erant, :L. cit., p. 69,
11

Ouv J. Pauker, The Role of the Military in Indonesia
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1960), p. 25.
12

Miller,

cit., 1,7. 3-4.

suppresicn was .to be accomplihe
unity itf...-elf was second.

The

cf stabiliIv or

_

was

-eccnoic

äS i

Engin.sel troops wouL.

ui1

fca.2.s,':'L.es

and dams.
2.

Military shop depots were to be models for

commerce and industry to emulate.
3.

-::ere to

or. 1,Eve

77 1- -c,ccts

and to be taught s-:11s which
when they returned
The last priori

civilian life.
- r the militar:- was ;
71-,paration for defense,

which i;.cluded ez.tablishIng a body of doct.zine, establishin - laws
and star.daidized regulations, recruiting new blood for the armed
-7.

forces, and undergoing a military buildup.13
Throughout the revolution, although the army played a
great political and governmental role, there were frequent conflicts
between the civilian government led by Sul<arno and Hatta, and the
ar-ry.

An attempt Was made in 1950 and 1951 to remove army

officers from participation in government and politics.

Since the

army was not committed to civilian rule as the United Stgtes would
understand it, a compromise was reached, in which the army insisted
upon a cabinet role In exchange for removing army officers and
their Influence at the local level.

14

.1
"Ibid., pp. 70-71.
14

Feith, cc. ct., pp. 208-20(,:.

15:, an event occurred which reflects the

Th Cct(.11'1

thL peried of military development.

The

d.IL:Lt ,-'d a

e

'
;.

,:dkarta, was carrying out plans to modernize

r.

he army.

A group cf former guerrilla officers disliked the

Ice ,:niefle ,20ea; ,Te tneir inadequate training was reflected in
1
:e,]er the ee,, policies. 5fel- example.
c: f017,,:r

Special
A lcrge nu,:iber

rriila f!;..hters
..
within the army feared the plan

cs1J .-in their rerval from the service when the strength of
16
army wculd be reduced from 200,000 to 100,000.
A political issue resulted because a Dutch military
mission was advising and aiding the Sultan in his plan.

The

o-e ponents of the plan charged that the army was losing its
revolutionary character and was acquiring a "colonial" status.
A rivalry between President Sukarno and the Sultan was a factor
at this time also, as Sukarno feared the role and ambitions of
17
the 1atter,

When the issue came befcre parliament, arguments

to make changes in the Defense Ministry were raised.

A number

of army officers petitioned Sukarno to dissolve parliament,
alleging that it was not representative because it had been
appointed by the several political parties.
15
Butwell,

OD.

16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.,

37.

cit.,

26.

The Nationalist
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party ,: cinitated this crisis on October 16, 1,
752, by introducing
a resoltic,n in parliament calling for early withdrawal of the
•-en"t - -e

:ne

t.c.r changes in the t:_olo echelons of the La,e1—€.
Ninistr

and the Armed Forces.
On October 17, the army organized a combination riot and

demonstration against parliament to demand dissolution of
p.carlia- nt and earL7 electins for a ncw 1:ationa1 Assembly.

It

apt:caf- T th:.: a iAlitarv coup 1..d 1),
y Colonel ilLeul ::asution, the
army coif of staff, may have been attempted here also.

However,

Pr sidnt .i:karno
.
appeared Lefore the crowd and met their demands
in a most charismatic fashion, thereby suppressing the apparent
coup before it ever accomplished it.; purpose.
A few days after the October 17 affair, three territorial
commanders (in East Java, East Indonesia, and in South Sumatra)
were removed by subordinate officers, apparently in protest
against what they believed to be actions of the military clique
18
in Djakarta.

The usurping officers declared allegiance to

President Sukarno while engaged in their acts of insubordination.
The government strongly rebuked the officers and promised to
"restore integrity and unity" in the armed forces.

However, the

new chief of staff formally appointed them to the positions
des ite the protest of Defense Minister Buwono.19

Ibid., p.8.
19ree7 th, or. cit...
:1
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As a result of this power struggle, Nasution was relieved
as chief of Htaff and a period of relative weakness and internal
di-

c,7r4:i to :Ise th::.
an

c„.

n:slrlent of represion in.3tead

of allowing it to carry out a control function in support of the
established constitutional order.

This appears to have been a

part of his overall plan to establish himself as a dictator.
- Octo1,1-,

te

F-,.2-:arnc to maintain

a controlling positic,n oases on
confusion.

20

n'irtured and manipulated

The army continued to be involved in the struggle

for po-zer rather than to use its collective strength, to create
a strong efficient government.

Su3.arno, fully realizing the

heterogeneous military and ideological backgrounds within the
army, used these differences to interfere with its intern
al affairs
and to prevent the army from taking any positive political action
.
As the years passed, Sukarno's power became more and more
dependent upon a very delicate balance between the army
and the
Indonesian Communist party, which grew to a strength of 2,500,
000
21
in 1957,
the largest :ommunist party in the world.

The army

was occupied with efforts to resist these maneuvers of
Sukarno's
while remaining, at the same time, deeply divided as
a result of
personal jealousies, conflicting outlooks, and specia interests
l
of particular officers.

It became satisfied with small gains,

individual rewards, and the realization of individual
tactical
20Pa,
..ker,
21

2E
: cit.,

Butwell,

p. 223.

ar
: Cit.,

p. 46.
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ob'lectives, rather than being cc.ncen,ed with idealistic goals or
achievement of political programs.

The army drifted with the

_
There apioar!, also to have :eve1o;d a vE.r.v definite
collective reluctance on the part of the military to assume full
responsibility for affairs of state, although strong setrents of
the military urged that action he taken.
7=ror thk nL1ctancc.

Many reasons can he

The 1-1.,..a_y cause

was

Indonesian cultuv,a, ralu ba7akism, which is an inherent religious
feeling of shame fcf an': action against the father figure which
is the symbol of the state.

23

In June, 1955, the cabinet of Dr. All Sastroamidjolo
a;-:cinled a very funicr colonel to the position c‘f chief of the
army staff.

All of the army commanders throughout Indonesia

objected and formally requested that a clear dividing line should
be drawn between political responsibility and technical
responsibility with regard to the appointments to this important
position.

This incident marked a clear change in emphasis in

policy.

Up to this tire the army had been mainly concerned

with resisting external interference in it2 internal affairs.
After this period the army began to play an active role in politics.
On October 27, 1955, Colonel Nasution was reappointed chief of

22
Pauker, cp. cit., p. 201.
23,
.nterview with Howard P. Jones, U. S. Ambassador to
In6onesia, l':58-19E5, July 17,
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staff an,i he began a long-range program to strengthen the army's
role in the development of his country.

24
"arehr

mIlitary

7hared 1-es;3nibi1ity in the :f...-velotment

of its ccuntry.
President Sukarno continued to develop his plan for
political centralism.

On March 2, 1957, his onponents proclaimed

a military regime in Ea,it in,lonesla.
the Sukarno government

An ultimatum was issued to

Its leader, and reaction stread through-

out the islands against "Javanese centralism" and communists in
the government.

Increasing opposition in the outer islands (which

the government was

- - ndent upon for taxes and large foreign

exchange earnings) forced out the All Sastroamidjojo cabinet in
March, 1957.

Throughout this year repeated efforts were made

to effect a compromise between the central government and the
dissidents.

Martial law was s proclaimed on March 14, 1957, giving

the officer corps import4It responsibilities for civilian affairs.
A national conference of army commanders was held in
September, 1957.

An Effort was made not only to bring about

reconciliation between Sukarno and the dissidents, but also to
truly unite the army.

The military participants in the conference

who included many rebel self-made "colonels," took an oath
pledging to obey unconditionally the decisions made by a commission
named by the conference.

25

2 1bid.
25
butwell, on. cit., p. 43.
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shment cf these "rebels" as we know it was never really
ccnsidereo.

cccur

!:asution always was very careful to differentiate

n ;omecne was disloyal .
- 3 1.he August,

revtion.

Disloya_zy to the revolution occurred when oppositio
democracy was advocated.

to guided

He was very lenient with most rebels,

allowing many of them to resign an -I pursue other interests.
The take-over of Dutch prci.:.erties in Lecember, 1957,
resulting in the control of the economic life of the country at
large, gave the officer corps additional responsibilities and
the opportunity to acquire managerial experience.

The formation

of a National Front in January, 1958, for the liberation of West
Irian with the Army Chief of Staff as general chairman and the
territorial commanders as local chairmen, provided the officer
corps with the task of organizing and directing a political
mass-movement.

The military campaigns against the rebellion

in Sumatra and the Celebes in February, 1958, strengthened the
discipline of the army, improved the training of its officers
and troops, and forced the government to make resources available
for the increase and modernization of its equipment.

Finally,

and most importantly, numerous conferences in 1957 and early
1958 under General Nasution's leadership began to create the habit
of joint examination of military, political, economic, ancl social
problems and cf Tolicy-making by the senior officers within the
military structure.26
26
Ihid., p. 226.
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At the end GI
of flux.

Inden,

in a state

However, the military had begun to assert itself and to
f
. !-Ien17

2.cve 1
- ,17nel-i. of themr..st
in

in its young h5story the army
political role.

r tne first time
peared to be taking an active

It further appeared that the officer corps was

becoming motivated by a more commonly held political ideology,
which was still evolving, and which was coming to be held by an
Increasing majority of the officer corps.

The army officer corps

loomed as one of the principle sources of political power and
administration capacities in Indonesia's future.
In 1958 army officers held one-fourth of the cabinet
portfolios in the government as well as a large number of
ether high positions of great trust.27

They continued to be

radicals with puritan prejudices enforced by discipline, who
respected education and technology as ends to efficiency, but
distrusted journalism and politics as temptations to license.
They were sympathetic to tradition because of their role in
preserving and securing the state and their culturally-based
respect for authority.20
There was a very definite gain in unity during this period,
probably as a result of officer feuds being exhausted during the
numerous rebellions of the latter part of the period.29
27
- Aim: Information Service, The Current Indonesian National
i.rmy's Role in the Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: Army Information Service, 1961), p. 226.
28
Grant,

Ea.

29,,..
p.

cit., p. 68.

75.
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The officers continued, however, to be intellectual captives
of the training that they received from the Japanese, in that they
'cit training concept.
This -,...- explain thrir revulsion against politicians and their
lack of real, purposeful united action.30
General Nasution embodied the general attitude of the
officer corps by thinking of himself and the officer corps as
watchdecs of the honor and dignity of the state.31

Army officers

in various economic enterprises brought emphasis on a national
consensus, unity, obedience, and discipline.32

On the other

band, the army developed baliwicks of influence, particularly in
regional governments (some refer to this as war lordism), state
enterprises, and matters directly affecting civil security.33

So

close did some of the outer islands groups feel •to the army that
they pressed their political demands upon the central government
through the army, rather than through civilian channels, in this
period.34
The army's prestige had been increased along with its
political authority.

It numbered 200,000 men.

It saw its role

30
Pauker, op. cit., p. 22.
31
Grant, op. cit., p. 80.
32Daniel
Dantel S. Lev, "The Political Pole of the Military in
Indonesiu," Public Affairs, XXXVI, No. 4, 351.
33Interview
vith Ambassador Howard P. Jones, July 17, 1967.
34
Army Information Service,

2.a•

cit., pp. 245-247.
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as an apparatus for maintenance of the nation's security and as
a functional group in bringing the revolution "safely to its

7Le army's revolutionary origins ard
operations against domestic political rebellions had made its
officer corps fully aware of national politics.36

The officer

corps in general did net belong to traditional political interest
groups such as royal and tribal groups.37

It was a non-

traditional group, and until 1956 had been on the political
defensive.

By 1958, however, it seemed to have achieved some

measure of political sophistication and its control over most
38
regional politica: and army units was nearly complete.
With exposure to the world the officer corps was fast
becoming a military elite.

A small number of officers had been

trained in Great Britain, India, Poland, Egypt, Czechoslovakia,
39
and China.

Many, quite naturally by this time, were being

schooled at their own Staff and Command School.
In summary, the causes defended and vigorously advocated
40
by the army in 1958 were as fo1lows:

35Ibid., p. 7.
36
Grant, op. cit., p. 66.
37
Grant, or. cit., p. 68.
38Lev, op. cit.
39
Pauker, on. cit., pp. 14C-153.
4
°Army Information Service,

2.E. cit.,

p• 10.
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1.

The constitution of the Republic
a.

Establishment of a unitary and national state
which is democratic in form.

b.

Establishment of a society which is just and
prosperous, materially, and spiritually.

c.

Support for the creation of a peaceful and
perfect international world.

2.

The Pantja Sila
Nationalism
Internationalism
Religion
Democracy
Social Justice

3.

The policy of the state
The TNT would implement and put into peaceful order
the policy of the Republic of Indonesia as passed
by the People's Assembly.

4.

Guided Democracy

CHAPTER EIaT

CONCLUSIONS

An army can consciously affect the eccnomic, social and
political development of a new nation, without the use of force.
It is likely to be most effective if it is motivated by a single
unifying ideology.
Indonesia is not geographically unified.

It is

culturally and socially unified only to the extent that its
varying peoples have undergone common commercial and other
experiences.
The colonial policy of indirect rule applied by the
gcvernment of the Netherlands failed to promote social unity or
economic integration.

The Dutch underrated the native capacity

for self-rule apparently tbecause they did not know the people.
The most important Indonesian colonial legacy was a solid base
of wide holdings of land among indigenous peoples.
The Japanese contributed to the self-confidence of the
Indonesian officer corps and furnished some training for the time
when memLers of the corps would be in control of Indonesia.

The

Japanese failed, however, to instill political sophisticaticn in
their officer trainees.

Most of those who underwent Japanese

training were influenced by the Bushido concept of spirited warfare
and were not imbued with the sense of compromise which seems an
essential part of political administration.

55
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Because the officer corps was deeply involved in Indonesia's
struggle for independence, it became completely implicated in the
development of naticnal consciousness, thus becoming more
political-minded than members of the officer corps in old
established countries who take the concept of nationhood for
granted.
By the early 1950's the corps had become part of a small
elite, in close contact with civil servants and politic
ians.
Most officers 'ere well known to each other, and many
had enjoyed
or would soon enjoy some additional comron experience of
training
in a closed institution overseas.
In the next few years, personal jealousies, special
interests, war-lordism, moral and material corruption,
plus
President Sukarno's influence, all contributed to negating the
effectiveness of leadership from the officer corps.
However, by 1959, the influence of the officer corps
became again more direct and positive because most
personal
interests and jealousies were nearly exhausted due to
the
overriding importance of defeating local insurgencies.

The

success of these anti-insurgent efforts produced a
commcn bond
among the warrior class.

By this time, although the officer

corps was still to a limited extent an intellectual
captive of
its Japanese training, its position as the watchdo
g of the honer
and dignity of the state, and as the protector of the
revolution,
had become clarified as supremely important
to its members.

0

APPENDIX I

THE MILITARY ORGANIC LAW OF 1954

Law No. 29, Year 1954
Concerning the Defense of the State
Republic of Indonesia
The President of the Republic of Indonesia:
Considering:
1. That the Indonesian People with struggle and sacrifice
have built the Indonesian State;
2. That the sovereiwIty, honor and importance of the
Republican Government furthermore must be defended against
menaces and invasions from any source;
3. That the aforesaid defense of the Government is the
right and duty of each citizen;
4. That it is necessary that principles for the regulation
of the defense of the Government be developed;
Keeping In Mind:
a. Articles 24, 61, 85, 101, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128 and
129 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia;
b. Article 89 of the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia;
c. Article 142 of the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia;
With the consent of the Peoples Representative Council of
the Republic of Indonesia;
Has Decided:
To Decree:
A law concerning the Defense of the State of the Republic
of Indonesia.
Chapter I. General
Article 1.
Taking part in the defense of the State, which means defending the
independence of the State and its territory, shall be an honor for
each citizen.
Article 2.
No citizen shall avoid taking part in the defense of the State except
by means of arrangements which are fixed by or based on this Law.
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Article 3.
The right to take part in the defense of the State shall be lost
whenever a citizen is convicted by a court of justice in connection
with an offense against the peace of the State.
Chapter II. The Character of Defense
Article 4.
The defense of the State of the Republic of Indonesia shall have a
character of regulated peoples defense and shall be carried out under
the leadership of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
Article 5.
The rights and duties of the citizen in taking part in the defense of
the State shall be performed under the following conditions:
a. The people, who shall be trained to carry out
resistance operations;
b. The Armed Forces, which shall consist of those who
enter it by voluntary agreement and those who enter it on a basis
of compulsory military duty.

or,

Article 6.
1. The Minister of Defense is empowered to select any
citizen between the ages of 15 and 55 years to join in defense
training outside of his daily work, which will not cause a loss
of livelihood.
2. The aforementioned trainees noted in Paragraph 1 shall
not be selected if:
a. They are now or ever have been members of the
Armed Forces, whether voluntarily or by selection;
b. They are now or ever have been members of the
State Police.
3. Military training and everything connected with it
shall be regulated in accordance with law.
Article 7.
1. Preliminary military training concerning peoples
defense shall be carried out in the schools and other places of
e(!'ication.
2. The training noted in Paragraph 1 above shall be
regulated in accordance with law.

4•..•

3

Article 8.
1. The qualifications for being accepted as a member of
the Armed Forces on a basis of voluntary agreement shall be:
a. Citizenship;
b. Being at least 18 years of age;
c. Healthy physique;
d. Having graduated from an elementary school or its
equivalent;
e. Never having been detained under dishonorable conditions by any branch of the State by decision of a court of justice;
f. The right of becoming a member not having been lost
by reason of a decision of a court of justice;
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g. !'ever having received a prison sentence of more
than one year;
h. The fulfillment of other qualifications which
shall be fixed by Government regulation.
2. The Armed Forces shall fix its voluntary enlistment
agreement and everything connected therewith in accordance with law.
Article 9.
The seletees shall be chosen from among those persons who fulfill
the following conditions:
a. Citizenship;
b. Between the ages of 18 and 40 years;
c. Sound physique;
d. Not having lost the right to become a member of the
Armed Forces by reason of a sentence by a court of justice.
Article 10.
The selectees shall not be chosen from:
a. Those whose status is such that if they should be called
for military service, the result would be that difficulties would be
caused in the lives of other persons for whom they are responsible;
b. Those who hold a religious office or an office of a
humane nature whose doctrine does not allow it;
c. Those who are performing important State duties.
Article 11.
The performance of compulsory military training shall be in
accordance with law.
Chapter III.
Section 1.

The Organization and Leadership of Defense

Concerning the Position of the Government

Article 12.
1. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the
:.rmed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
2
In the office aforementioned in Paragraph 1, the
President shall hold the highest authority over the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Indonesia.
3. All decisions of the President in connection with his
authority over the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia,
aforementioned in Paragraph 1, also shall be signed by the Minister
of Defense.
Article 13.
The Government shall fix public policy in the realm of defense.
Article 14.
1. The Ocvernment shall form from among the Ministers a
Peace Council which shall be chaired by the Prime Minister and which
shall have the duty of giving advice to the Government concerning
peace problems and the planning of the mobilization of all sources
of the strength of the State.
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2. The aforementioned Council noted in Paragraph I also
may Mve more extensive duties defined in accordance with
Government regulations.
Article 15.
The Minister of Defense shall fix policy and plans Lased on public
policy in the realm of defense, control their execution and be
responsible to the Peoples Representative Council concerning those
matters.
Section 2.

Concerning the Armed Forces

Article 16.
The Armed Forces is the vanguard of the defense of the State and
of the training of the people for defense.
Article 17.
The Armed Forces
a. The
b. The
c. The

shall consist of:
Army;
Navy;
Air Force.

Article 18.
1. Each Armed Force shall be led by a Chief of Staff of
the Armed Force who also shall be Supreme Commander of the Armed
Force for up to a period of four years.
2. The Chiefs of Staff noted in Paragraph 1 above shal,
be appointed and discharged by the Go,/ernment.
3. At the end of the period of time noted in Paragraph 1
above, a Chief of Staff may be reappointed.
4. The Chief of Staff of an Armed Force shall be a Special
Advisor to the Minister of Defense concerning the creation, training
and utilization of his Armed Force and shall be the planning agent
for its creation, training and utilization as fixed by the Minister
of Defense.
Article 19.
1
Coordination between the Armed Forces shall be through
the formation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff which shall consist of all
Chiefs of Staff and which shall be chaired in rotation for a period
of up to one year by each Chief of Staff in accordance with
Government regulations.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be a Special Advisor
to the Minister of Defense concerning operational coordination
between the Armed Forces.
Section 3.

Concerning Administration in Time of War

Article 20.
1. In wartime the Peace Council which was noted in
Article 14 shall become a Defense Council and also shall have the
duty of carrying out the authority of the Government as regards
defense.
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2. Changes in the administration of the Defense Council
shall be in accordance with Government regulations.
3. The Chairman, or if he is unable to attend, the Vice
Chairman of the Peoples Representative Council shall be required
to attend meetings of the Defense Ccuncil as an advisor and shall
receive notice of all decisions of the Defense Council.
Article 21.
1. In time of war all combat units of the Armed Forces
and peoples defense in general shall be led by a Supreme Commander
in accordance with appointments made by the Government.
2. The territory of the Republic of Indonesia shall be
divided into war areas; the combat units of the Armed Forces and
peoples defense in the aforesaid areas shall be led by a War
Commander.
3. The Supreme Commander and the War Commanders shall
be appointed and discharged by the Government.
Article 22.
In time of war the authorities of each Chief of Staff for t.)
-.e
use of combat units of the Armed Forces which are fixed under
the Commander-in-Chief shall be vested in the Supreme Commander.
Secticn 4.

Concerning the Government in Time of War

Article 23.
The connection between the military authorities and the Governme“t
in time of war shall be regulated in accordance with law.
Chapter IV.

Rights and Duties of Members of the Armed Forces

Article 24.
The members of the Armed,Forces shall be officers, non-commissioned
officers and enlisted men who voluntarily or by selection become
members of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Article 25.
At the time of becoming a member of the Armed Forces, a citizen
shall be required to take an oath.
Article 26.
A member of the Armed Forces shall have the duty of withholding
military secrets. This duty also shall continue after he is
discharged.
Article 27.
A member of the Armed Forces shall not be permitted to perform
political actions within the limits of a definition such that he
shall not have an attitude or perform actions which could lessen
military discipline.
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Article 28.
A member of the Armed Forces shall give advance notice to his
superior officer of joining any group, unless determined otherwise
by the Minister of Defense.
Article 29.
A member of the Armed Forces shall give advance notice of marriage
to his superior officer.
Article 30.
A member of the Armed Forces shall not take other employment outsid
e
of his service without permission from his superior officer.
Article 31.
A member of the Armed Forces who leaves the Armed Forces under
honorable conditions shall be given preference in appcintments to
Government service and to private firms, whenever he has qualif
ications which are the equal of those of cther applicants.
Article 32.
A member of the Armed Forces who has left the Armed Forces
under
honorable conditions shall be allowed to wear uniform clothi
ng
with the symbol of his final rank in national or certified milita
ry
ceremonies which are fixed by Government regulations.
Article 33.
The President may grant honorary ranks in the Armed rorces
to any
persons who are not members of the Armed Forces in accord
ance with
methods which are certified by Government regulations.
Article 34.
Other rights under justice of members of the Armed Forces
shall
he regulated in accordanaie with or under authority of
law.
Article 35.
1. The Armed Forces has its own system of justice and
commanding officers have the right to receive cases at
law.
2. The regulation and authority of bodies which are
authorized to administer military justice in the broad meanin
g of
the term, military criminal, civil and moral law, includ
ing also
military disciplinary law, shall be regulated by
law.
Article 36.
Demobilization, whether complete or partial, as well
as all
ramifications of the aforesaid demobilization, shall
be regulated
in accordance with law.
Chapter V.

Declaration of War, Cessation of Hostilities, and Peace

Article 37.
The President shall declare war and arrange peace after receiv
ing
the agreement of the Peoples Representative Council.
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Article 38.
The President shall carry out cessations of hostilities.
Chapter VI.

Final Decisions

Article 39.
1. The Adminis, •tion of each Armed Force as it is found
to be at the time of ent,) into force of this Law, shall be fixed
until changed or modified by new regulations, within the intent
of this Law.
2. The intents which are found in other laws and
regulations wnich are in force at the time of promulgation of
this Law shall continue to be effective except as they are not
in accord with this Law.
Article 40.
This Law may be called "The Defense Law" and shall become effective
on the day it is promulgated, except for the intent of Article 35
Paragraph 1 concerning the receipt of cases by Commanding Officers,
which shall he(-ome effective when fixed by Government regulation.
So that each person may be enabled to know it, it is ordered that
the promulgation of this Law be entered in the State Archives
of the Republic of Indonesia.

Made official in Djakarta on September 3, 1954.

President of the Republic of Indonesia
(Sukarno)

Prime Minister
(Ali Sastroamidjojo)

Minister of Defense
(Iwa Kusumasumantri)

Legalized on September 6, 1954.
Minister of Justice
(Djody Gondokusumo)
State Archives No. ri4
Year 1954
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APPENDIX II

KEY TO INDONESIAN LANGUAGES

A.

Malayo-Polynesian language family

I.

Sumatran group
3. Ot-Danum group
1. Atjehnese
4. Kenja-Bahau-Kajan group
2. Gajo
5. Murut group
Badjau (sea nomads)
3. Batak dialects
B
a. Northern group
(Karo, 1as, Pakpak)
IV. Balinese-Sasak group
b. Toba
1. Balinese
c. Simalungun
2. Sasak
d. Angkola-Mandailing
3. Suinlawan
4. Minangkabau
4*. Lubu
V. Philippine group
3. Malay dialects
1. Sangir-Talaud
a. Riouw Malay
la. Bantik
b. Djakarta Malay
lb. Bentenan
c. Kubu
2. Mongondou
d. Moluccan Malay
3. Tombulu-Tonsea-Tondano
6. Middle Malay
4. Tontemboan-Tonsawang
7. Redjang-Lebong
8. Lampung
VI. Gorontalo group
1. Bulanga
9. Simalur
10. Nias
2. Kaidipan
10*. Sichule
3. Gorontalo
11. Mentawai
4. Buol
12. Enggano
13. Lontjong (along the
VII. Tomini group
coast of Bangka)
14. Lom
VIII. Toradja group
15. Crang Laut
1. Kaili
2. Kulawi
Javanese group
3. Pipikoro
1. Sudanese
4. Napu
2. Javanese
5. Badal-Besoa
3. Madurese
6. Leboni
/. Bare'e
Bornean group
8. Wotu
(Dayak languages)
1. Klemantan group
2. Iban group

IT.

III.

4-

6`)
IX.

IXa.
X.

XI.

XIT.

XIII.

Loinang group
1. Lcinang
2. Bobongko
3. Balantak

XIV.

Banggai
Bungku-Laki group
1. Eungku-Mori
2. Laki
3. Laiwui
4. Landawe
5. Mapute
South
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Celebes languages
Makassarese
Buginese
Luwu
Sa'dan
Pitu-Uluna-Salu
Mandar dialects
Seko

Muna-Putung group
1. Muna-Butung
2. South Butung
3. Languages of the islands
of Tukangbesi, Kalaotoa,
Karompa, and Bonerate
4. Wolio and Lajolo
Eima-Sumba group
1. Bima
2. Manggarai
3. Ngad'a-Lic
4. West Samba
5. East Surba
6. 11(11411

B.

North Halmaheran language
family (Ternate, Tidore, etc.)

C.

Papual languages

XV.

XVI.

Ambon-Timor group
1. Kroe
2. Solar
3. Kedang, Alor, and Pantar
group (on Alor some
Papual languages are also
spoken)
4. Belu (Tetum)
5. Marae
6. Timor (Dawah)
7. Kupang
8. Roti
9. Wetar languages
10. Roma
11. Kisar
12. Leti, etc.
13. Damar languages
14. Tanimbar languages
15. Kai
'6
Aru
17. Puru
18. Ambeldu
19. West Ceram languages
20. rast Ceram languages
21. Goram languages
22. Panda
Sula-Batjan group
1. Taliabo dialects
2. Sula dialects
3. Batjan (nearly gone)
South Halmaheran-West New
Guinea group
1. South Halmaheran
languages
2. Nufor
3. Windesi
4. Kowiai, etc.
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